

Policy Proposal: Industrial Redevelopment of PA's Mill Towns

90-754 Elective Politics and Policymaking, Fall 2020

The goal of this proposal is to spur industrial development in Pennsylvania's mill towns – places that were hit by economic decline over the past half-century, but also missed out on the high-tech boom that PA's bigger cities enjoyed. In particular, I am proposing a two-part policy initiative, aimed at **preparing industrial sites for redevelopment**, and **clearing the way for high-impact investors** to set up shop there.

Motivation and background

A review of academic literature supports the importance of this goal (see Appendix A). Evidence from recent studies in urban economics points to the existence of positive spillovers caused by manufacturing's growth in a town, including increases in local wages, the generation of indirect employment, and higher property values. On the other hand, the disappearance of manufacturing (e.g. due to exposure to foreign imports) has been linked to potentially large, long-term drops in employment and incomes beyond the affected sector itself. This suggests that promoting industrial development is an important objective for policymakers, since spillovers are a "market failure" not optimized by the private sector acting alone. Likewise, research also shows that well-designed policy has historically resulted in the successful creation or repurposing of industrial capacity – most notably in the industrial mobilization effort for WWII.

Focusing on site preparation and marketing is an especially appealing mechanism for promoting industrial development. As mentioned in Appendix A, it may be more effective to repurpose existing industrial capacity, rather than building it from scratch; this would include not only industrial sites themselves, but other valuable features like experienced manufacturing workers, local suppliers and service providers, and dedicated logistical infrastructure. Likewise, allowing these resources to go underutilized represents a large "inefficiency" for the economy, and (in the worst case) can result in harmful blight.

For these reasons, industrial rebirth is a perennial goal for the Pittsburgh region. For example:

- 1985's Strategy21 included numerous local industrial rehabilitation programs (e.g. targeting specific sites in the Mon Valley);
- in 1995, the Allegheny Conference's "Southwestern Regional Investment Partnership" had an Investing in Our Future plan, which included an "Industrial Reuse and Technology Development Strategy" aiming to rehabilitate sites and create thousands of jobs;
- recent years have brought a number of development plans for specific neighborhoods, towns or regions (e.g. the 2005 Mon Valley Economic Strategy); many of these also give a central role to rehabilitating industrial sites;
- finally, industrial development organizations such as the Regional Industrial Development Corporation (RIDC) have seen success purchasing and rehabilitating individual sites. The RIDC's most recent effort is the Hazelwood Green project, transforming one of the final brownfield locations in Pittsburgh proper. Looking forward, RIDC has expressed interest in expanding their work in distressed towns and counties outside of Pittsburgh.

Of course, not all of these efforts have been successful. And others have been limited in their inclusivity, with complaints that not enough benefits accrue to the workers and families who were affected by the original industrial decline. That is, developments may have created jobs for high-skill out-of-staters, but largely left out the people who needed help the most (and who have a lot to offer). Finally, even for the highest-impact initiatives, it's possible that the policy tools they used are currently in jeopardy (see discussion below).

The Proposal

To encourage industrial development in PA's mill towns, I am proposing a two-part state legislative package: (i) recapitalizing the "Business in Our Sites" site preparation lending program, and (ii) a site evaluation, pre-clearance, and marketing pilot, vetting and highlighting the highest-impact industrial sites in former mill towns.

Industrial site preparation

After the collapse or departure of a local manufacturer, it's common for their former grounds to remain vacant for years or decades. Not only is there difficulty in finding a new tenant, but there also can be serious environmental and regulatory obstacles to putting the location back to use. The severity of these issues often dissuades normal for-profit developers from taking on the task.

Many laws have been passed aimed at this issue. The most well-known federal program is the so-called Superfund for sites tainted by hazardous waste (brownfields). At the state level in PA, bills like SB1 of 1995 (the Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act) also encouraged the cleanup of postindustrial sites.¹ Rarer, however, are bills that go beyond cleanup and towards comprehensively preparing a site for a new investor.

One exception is the state's *Business in Our Sites (BOS)* program [\[link\]](#). Launched in 2004 (under SB 1026), and housed in the Commonwealth Financing Authority (CFA), BOS uses a mix of loans and grants to help municipalities, industrial development agencies, and/or private developers fund the full set of activities needed to make a site "shovel-ready" for an investor. The program has been highly utilized: its initial allocation of \$100 million in grants has been fully exhausted, as has its initial \$200 million allocation in loans. It's since been recapitalized at least 3 times (in 2013, 2016 and 2017), e.g. with funds redirected from less-utilized programs.

This funding reallocation is, in fact, a great demonstration of the BOS program's success in the "market" of development tools. There are over a hundred programs and initiatives [listed on the PA Department of Community & Economic Development \(DECD\) website](#), and [over a dozen](#) loan, grant and loan guarantee programs under the CFA alone. Yet not all of these programs have

¹ In general, these bills tended to focus on clarifying the liability around the removal of hazardous waste in the sites. Many of them covered only the most dangerous sites. In the case of Pennsylvania's SB1 (which became Act 2 of 1995), the liability of a site's owners going forward would be protected in the event that a good-faith cleanup effort was undertaken there. In theory, this would mean that previously risky sites were now better incentivized for rehabilitation and development. Yet these incentives only go as far as encouraging cleanups; a site might be rendered no longer hazardous, but still lack the intensive, longer-term rehabilitation effort needed to make it attractive for community-oriented development.

been consistently requested by private investors or development practitioners; many have yet to extinguish their original allocation.² It's thus a signal of high, sustained demand that BOS consistently has more requests than its funding can sustain.

This demand appears to have translated into real results. According to [DCED in 2016](#), “projects funded through this initiative have created more than 22,000 jobs and secured \$2.2 billion in private investment”; BOS’s \$75 million loan recapitalization that year was projected to bring in another 6,500 jobs and \$490 million in private investment. That’s an impressive ROI. The RIDC uses BOS funds for multiple projects, including [a grant of \\$4 million grant and a loan of \\$6 million](#) (at a favorable 3% interest rate over 20 years) for its Hazelwood Green rehabilitation. Don Smith, head of the RIDC, spoke highly of the program, mentioning its low interest rates and “patient” terms for repayment. While he wished that the amounts be even higher and the allowed uses more flexible, he acknowledged that this may be due to its currently limited funding.

In the short term, my proposal would be another one-off recapitalization of the BOS program. While loan repayment rates are apparently quite high (possibly enough to cover the CFA bonds, which themselves have relatively low interest rates), the program is said to be running low on funds again; this may be due to BOS grants and from operating expenses. This recapitalization might be accomplished through further reallocation from underutilized programs (as it did in 2016 and 2017), or a simple budgetary allocation (as it did in 2013).

In the long-term, however, these ad hoc recapitalizations may be unsustainable. It will get increasingly difficult to find funds to reallocate, and fresh funding is never reliable in any given budget (especially in lean years like this one). Furthermore, the CFA overall is taking on increasingly larger amounts of debt, and may hit its statutory debt limit soon ([according to the deficit-hawkish Allegheny Institute](#)).

Thus, it may be necessary to establish a dedicated revenue stream for BOS going forward. The CFA lacks the authority to raise funds itself; some minor revenue sources have been tucked into past laws, such as from gaming and fracking fees. The most noteworthy attempt may have been the 2019 Restore PA Act (SB 725 and HB 1585). It introduced a severance tax on natural gas exports, which “the Independent Fiscal Office has determined will be [primarily paid for by out-of-state residents](#),” generating \$4.5 billion (over four years) for BOS and other programs. While the act failed, there may be political lessons for another attempt (see below); it’s also a promising sign that finding revenue for BOS is a high priority for state legislators in general.

Industrial site evaluation and marketing

It’s not enough to make a site shovel-ready; you also need to get investors to bring their shovels. Many sites won’t need extra help, e.g. if they’re already near a large metro area (like Pittsburgh or Philly) or near an existing large manufacturer needing suppliers (like Volvo CE’s plant in Franklin County). But the ambit of this proposal is industrial development in former mill towns, which have yet to successfully pivot into a new economy activity.

² In particular, “underutilized programs” giving their funds to BOS were the First Industries Program (for tourism and agriculture, and created in the same 2004 bill as BOS) and Building PA (loans for real estate investment).

What might industrial site selectors look for, from locations in these mill towns? A survey conducted by Cleave et al. (2016) provides answers. To begin, industrial land needs to be prepared and cleared for investors' specific needs. "*We look for certified sites [...] sites that have most or all of the environmental and geotechnical work done to prove that the site is shovel ready. That you can start building on it right away.*" The study also suggested that governments need to put serious effort into making large amounts of practical information available online, for each site and its feasible industrial uses. (See Appendix B for more on the study's findings; in particular, it shows that *site selectors prioritize immediate shovel readiness over financial incentives – time is money!*) Put together, this entails a large amount of legwork beyond the scope of BOS: anticipating needs, doing the vetting, and preparing digital marketing materials.

One useful comparator for such an effort is JobOhio's [SiteOhio evaluation and marketing program](#), which claims to be "a more stringent and comprehensive review and analysis than any other state site certification process in the U.S." The current list of vetted sites contains just 24 locations: a clear focus on quality over quantity. Each plot comes with large amounts of info online, including potentially sensitive (but highly useful) items like price per acre and pollutants present (see Appendix C). It's also clear from the website that a lot of behind-the-scenes work has gone into vetting and clearing these sites. Each has an array of Due Diligence Studies and Reports already completed, from geotechnical surveys to Endangered Species Analysis. On a superficial level, the website is well designed (easy to navigate and to view the relevant details), and jam-packed with photographs and videos of each industrial site.

Pennsylvania, in fact, has its own [site search website](#) for prospective investors. It looks well-crafted, and is easy to use for a number of different search types. But its function is more akin to a listing / database of possible sites: it currently contains 1,933 listings.³ This makes it a different animal from SiteOhio: there is no obvious curation, no short-list of the most "shovel-ready" sites. Likewise, the listings don't offer any evidence of being vetted or pre-cleared.⁴ PA-based practitioners have also highlighted the shortcomings of the website. They mention its relatively simple focus on listing basic aspects of the individual sites, rather than looking for the deeper needs of manufacturers, and marketing the sites that best meet those needs.

That said, there are signs that more intensive evaluation and marketing processes are possible here in PA. There are certainly many town- and region-level initiatives to point to, such as the Strategy21 plan in SW PA. At the state level, one recent precedent is DCED's [Coal-Fired Power Plant Redevelopment Playbooks](#). The reports were [funded the U.S. Economic Development Administration \(EDA\)'s POWER initiative](#) – \$960k for studies on how to repurpose three sites housing coal power plants. For each site, the initiative brought together a team of public groups (state and local) and private groups (investors, consultancies and non-profits) to research the first steps of evaluation and marketing. They document the necessary improvements, approvals /

³ Limiting the search to industrial sites of at least 20 acres yields 185 results, of which 11 are in SWPA.

⁴ We can use the website's listing for the Mon River Industrial Park Land in Allenport* as an example. It gives a fair amount of useful site information (and a large amount of automatically-generated local demographic statistics), but is missing a few key details (such as the asking price per acre). Crucially, there's also no sign that any clearances have been conducted in preparation of its use; carrying out such clearances would of course be out-of-scope for the website's creators. Finally, there is no indication that this is a *preferred* industrial site; the website as a whole offers no answer for the question "where are the top 20 places in PA for my factory today?" (*There's also no obvious way to link to a specific industrial site from the website, which is why this footnote has no link in it.)

clearances, and timetables to make the sites “shovel ready lite.” Each of these have been tailored to a small number of possible industrial use-cases (i.e. “plays” that respond to different market signals). (See Appendix D for screenshots from one of them.) It’s not clear if these recommendations were followed, nor whether they meaningfully encouraged the sites’ successful redevelopment. But they show a clear path towards replicating the SiteOhio example in PA.

In the short term, my proposal would be to conduct another site evaluation and marketing exercise (similar to the “Playbooks”), extending its scope from recommendations to action. That is, the teams should actually carry out the steps they deem necessary to achieve “shovel-ready-lite” status in each site (see page 16). Furthermore, the teams should target sites in former mill towns, and identify development use-cases for those sites that explicitly rely on existing local workers and businesses. The sites would also ideally (but not necessarily) be past or current recipients of BOS finance. If this round is perceived as a success, it can perhaps be repeated, and eventually formalized as a dedicated function of DCED (for example).

Political considerations

Political considerations for industrial site preparation proposal

The past political performance of BOS (and similar legislation) is impressive. One of its antecedents, the 1995 site cleanup bill, passed unanimously in the state senate and 163-35 in the house. The 2004 bill containing the BOS program itself had a similar trajectory, passing unanimously in the state senate and 188-7 in the state house. Since then, multiple budget and omnibus amendment bills have included extra funding for BOS. The program also has found its way into political messaging, including the 2011 state senate Democrats’ policy platform (“PA Works”) and the current Governor’s flagship “Restore PA” Act.

This political success could be due to multiple factors. First, it’s an effective and highly-utilized program, as mentioned above. The idea of enabling private businesses and developers to create jobs is also “on-brand” for both parties. It also has wide geographic reach (beyond the big cities), and (in theory) should pay for itself (at least the loan portion), keeping deficit hawks at bay.

That said, the defeat of the Restore PA Act – which would have taxed natural gas exports to fund BOS and other programs – reveals some potential weaknesses. That bill was killed in committee after introduction, despite having a degree of [bipartisan support](#) (local leaders throughout the state, and a near-majority of cosponsors in both chambers – 99 in the house and 25 in the senate). The simplest explanation is that it wasn’t bipartisan enough – a few GOP legislators won’t suffice if the floor leaders aren’t on board. Those GOP leaders’ lack of support, in turn, could come from at least two sources. The first might be a hesitation to hand the Governor a high-visibility victory of any kind; that is, BOS is perhaps too popular to be credited to any one party or leader. The second explanation might be the GOP’s reluctance to create a new tax (especially one that could hurt the fossil fuel industry). Since BOS is not as financially self-sufficient as intended (see discussion above),⁵ its long-term survival is tied to finding funding for it; in the short term, it may be forced to rely on more ad-hoc / one-off funding fixes.

⁵ This lack of self-sufficiency itself can be seen as a political vulnerability. It has already drawn the attention of anti-deficit organizations like the Allegheny Institute, for example (see above). Of course, very few programs pay for

Finally, for this proposal to be politically viable, it is not enough for BOS-funded projects to attract new investment to a site; it is imperative that redevelopment directly benefits the wider community around it. After all, the true aim of this proposal is the revival of mill towns, and not just individual sites within them. If anything, the original value of these sites was in the livelihoods they could sustain in the communities that surrounded them. From this perspective, it makes sense that a profitable but non-inclusive redevelopment would be seen as a failure. Thus, political leaders may block the legislation (or its implementation) if they think it leaves out or harms their constituents; anti-gentrification activists could also stand in opposition for the same reasons. The BOS-funded Hazelwood Green project offers a good example. A state rep. for the Hazelwood area, Jake Wheatley, was actually the main sponsor of the house's Restore PA bill (which would have established dedicated funding for BOS). Yet even he was reportedly torn about the project, both ["supportive"](#) and ["concerned"](#), in particular that "more isn't being done to ensure that the residents of Hazelwood and the surrounding communities benefit from the jobs that this project will create." Likewise, City Councilman [Corey O'Connor recently came out in opposition](#) to one aspect of the development, again concerned that it wouldn't benefit his constituents (and might redirect money meant for other purposes).

It may be possible to inoculate the program against these concerns. As stated before, the program should be explicitly targeted at investments reliant on local workers and suppliers. Policymakers could also explore community benefit agreements and/or community impact statements, perhaps making them recommended or required parts of the program. This might make BOS less flexible, but could perhaps increase its overall impact in the end.

Political considerations for industrial site evaluation and marketing proposal

It's hopefully safe to assume that the industrial site evaluation and marketing pilot would face a similar political calculus: they make the same type of appeal (pro-business, pro-jobs), and have the same wide geographic coverage. It's promising that JobsOhio is thriving under Ohio's Republican-controlled legislatures and governorship. Furthermore, while the pilot would have its costs (e.g. procuring technical site studies and digital marketing materials), these would be in the single millions at most (and might be covered by a federal grant, much like the POWER Initiative from the US EDA). Starting as a pilot could also avoid accusations of government sprawl. And pilot sites can be hand-picked to favor ones where communities are already on board. On the other hand, the same GOP concern about handing the Governor's office a political tool would apply here. In fact, the PA Sites website mentioned above is currently run by the "Governor's Action Team," as opposed to generic DCED staff.

Ultimately, the political viability of these initiatives will depend on their ability to bring high-visibility results. As with the original BOS program, demonstrated effectiveness can generate sustained demand and political support. As the saying goes, "nothing succeeds like success."

themselves, so this may be an unfair concern to raise. And in fact, its true net cost may be lower than the sticker price, since a more accurate assessment would include the tax revenue gains from successful projects.

APPENDICES:

- **APPENDIX A:** Evidence from economic literature on local spillovers from manufacturing, and government’s role in promoting local industrial development
- **APPENDIX B:** Key takeaways from study on industrial site selectors’ priorities
- **APPENDIX C:** Screenshots from SiteOhio’s online materials
- **APPENDIX D:** Screenshots from DCED project: “Decommissioning & Redevelopment Playbook for the Cromby Generation Station”
- **References**

APPENDIX A: Evidence from economic literature on local spillovers from manufacturing, and government’s role in promoting local industrial development

It should come as no surprise that manufacturing brings external benefits. Estimates from input-output frameworks (such as those using the IMPLAN tool) typically find that manufacturing projects bring high levels of indirect employment (through increased local demand of goods and services, and through extra incomes). Academic studies have been able to verify that much of these spillovers is directly caused by growth in local manufacturing. Moretti (2010) uses national-level shifts in demand to show that each additional manufacturing job leads to the creation of 1.6 non-manufacturing jobs on average (including both skilled and unskilled jobs); gains are biggest from machinery and electrical equipment production (4.9 jobs for each new job). Non-manufacturing, “non-tradable” sectors (such as retail or real estate) tend to have much smaller (or negligible) spillovers, since they don’t bring “outside money” into the region.⁶ More concretely, Greenstone et al. (2010) find that the opening of a new “million-dollar plant” can increase levels of productivity, wages and property values in the town (beyond the plant itself).

The same is true in reverse as well: a decrease in manufacturing can lead to harm for the whole town. Kovak (2013) gives evidence that wages in the non-tradable sector should fall in proportion with negative price shocks in the tradable sector (e.g. due to increased competition with low-cost imports); mill towns with highly concentrated manufacturing industries may be especially vulnerable. One well-known study (Autor et al., 2013) shows that increased exposure to competition from Chinese imports had devastated manufacturing hubs. Workers and families there saw a long-term hit to income and employment, but rarely left town (or were unable to). This widespread unemployment adds up to a serious “efficiency loss”: workers who normally contributed to the local economy are unable to put their specialized skills and experience to work, resulting in a suboptimal outcome for the local economy. Government efforts to help them – e.g. trade adjustment assistance and unemployment payments – were also quite small: families received just 10% in aid compared to the incomes they lost.

Finally, studies have also documented prior policy achievements in encouraging industrial development. A major part of the industrial mobilization for WWII involved the publicly funding or subsidizing the construction of new factories. Garin (forthcoming) found that these factories were associated with higher levels of well-paying jobs in their counties, even after the war. A similar paper looking at the South during WWII (Jaworski, 2017) came to a similar conclusion: while it suggests that public investment couldn’t build long-term industrial capacity wholesale, it could help shift existing capacity for other purposes (e.g. pivots to other industries). Prior to the war, the Roosevelt administration also pushed for manufacturing development through industrial infrastructure programs like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). A study of the TVA (Kline and Moretti, 2014) found an associated boost in local productivity, large enough that the program paid for itself; the one caveat was that this benefit may have come from reallocating resources from other states, rather than special synergies. Yet even the ability to reallocate and put to work underused workers and suppliers would be a major policy success.

⁶ There are of course other tradable sectors beyond manufacturing, which also serve to bring outside money into a town; these include agriculture, extractives, tourism, and trade in services (like IT). However, virtually none are associated with the same number of mid-wage blue-collar jobs as manufacturing; this highly limits the direct impact.

APPENDIX B: Key takeaways from study on industrial site selectors' priorities

For their qualitative study, Cleave et al. (2016) interview ten different site selection agencies, and contrast their most requested features with those provided by government economic development practitioners. While their full conclusions are worth checking out (see their main table and figure reproduced below), some takeaways are especially relevant for redeveloping PA's mill towns.

First, they dispel some misconceptions about less effective policies. They report that **industrial site selectors are rarely persuaded by the following factors:**

- visual brands, slogans, etc. for a town or region, or positive press mentions of the region;
- quality of life / livability, since they're interested in hiring local workers (who don't need to be convinced to live there);⁷
- local costs (e.g. wages) and financial incentives: "Generally, site selectors were unmoved by incentives, indicating that '*costs are not the defining factor of site selection*' ... '*there are many other factors we need to consider before we can even start to think about costs or incentives*'."

These findings may be unexpected here; in particular, PA practitioners often cite the state's relative lack of tax and non-tax incentives as an obstacle to investment attraction.

Yet to site selectors, time is money. Pressure for short-term returns mean they need to start fast, without uncertainty; delays kill profits. "Having available, shovel-ready land '*is much more important than cash money, because it's going to save the client so much time that they are going to be able to get into that building ahead of schedule.*'" The authors speculated that it's possible that "businesses considering relocation are most concerned with the near-term and are willing to make long-term sacrifices if it allows for immediate profitability."

Finally, it is noted in the main text of this proposal that their definition of "shovel-ready" is quite comprehensive, including items like clearances and approvals; if these steps are not already taken on their behalf, then they at least want them to be easy (e.g. combined into a one-stop shop) and fast / predictable.

The main text also notes the high informational demands of site selectors: they tend to want all information in one place – online – including cost of the land, taxes and fees, and even local housing prices. The goal is essentially to make it as easy as possible for the site selectors to add you to their shortlist.

⁷ A notable exception is when investors expect to need a high share of outside talent (e.g. niche R&D labs using high-skill or specialized workers). But this is said to be the exception, rather than the rule, as investors vastly prefer to have sufficient talent already available in the region. Most importantly, the goal of this proposal – targeting the mill towns and workers left behind by the tech boom – would tend to exclude these types of investment. The most inclusive investments would call for a mix of high, low and mid-skill workers.




Table 2. Importance of place brand components for practitioners and site selectors.

Brand element	Practitioners		Site selectors	
	Mentions	Perceived importance	Mentions	Perceived importance
Visual identity and narrative	24	High	2	None
Location and logistics	22	High	10	High
Financial considerations	15	High	3	Variable to Low
Available talent	18	High	10	High
Government efficiency	10	Moderate	10	High
Infrastructure	8	Low	8	Moderate
Quality of place	23	Moderate	6	Variable to Low
Channel of communication	25	Print: high In person: high Digital: moderate	5	Print: low In person: moderate Digital: high

Note: the study includes a total of 25 practitioners and 10 site selectors.

APPENDIX C: Screenshots from SiteOhio's online materials [\[link\]](#)

Find Your Next Location

Welcome to SiteOhio, a site selection evaluation program that goes beyond the common site certification process. SiteOhio puts properties within industrial zoning through a more stringent and comprehensive review and analysis than any other state site certification process in the U.S.



SiteOhio authenticated sites are a step above certified sites. These sites are construction ready, meaning that each site is ready for immediate development on day one.

Site authentication guarantees that all utilities are on the property and have adequate capacity, that due diligence studies have been completed, and that all state and federal entities have provided concurrence with the studies. SiteOhio site authentication also ensures the site is free of incompatible uses, with no limitations or insurance liability based on surrounding properties. Many of the sites have highway access and rail access on site, which are designated below by symbols.

Properties that have earned the SiteOhio seal of authentication are listed below. Click on the links to watch aerial site tours, download site PDFs and view more details of our fully vetted SiteOhio authenticated sites.

Source: JobsOhio - SiteOhio [\[link\]](#)

FREDERICKTOWN INDUSTRIAL PARK

Fredericktown, Knox County



SiteOhio authenticated means construction ready day one. Fredericktown Industrial Park, which has been deemed among Ohio's top sites, has all utilities reaching to the park boundaries, all due diligence studies completed with clear findings, and access to a large regional labor force. The Area Development Foundation and One Columbus collaborated to inventory the site's compelling features that make it ideal for business.

The industrial park:
 has robust electric service. | is visible from State Route 13. | has flat topography.



PROPERTY DETAILS

Physical address	9775 Salem Road
City	Fredericktown
County	Knox
Zip code	43019
Type of space	Industrial
Ownership	Fredericktown Industrial Park Ltd.
Min size	1 acre
Max size	23.44 contiguous acres (38.53 total)
Price per acre	\$35,000
Industrial park	Yes
Enterprise zone	Yes
Foreign Trade zone	Yes
Date available	Immediate

WHAT DOES "DAY ONE" MEAN TO COMPANIES?

"Day one" is the promise that all sites authenticated by SiteOhio are construction ready the very first day.

When you see the SiteOhio seal, you know:

- All utilities are to park boundaries with adequate capacities.
- All due diligence studies are complete and clear of issues.
- The site has compatible uses, with no limitations or insurance liability based on surrounding property.

CONTACT INFORMATION

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- jobsOhio.com/sites

From dossier for Fredericktown Industrial Park: [\[link\]](#) | [\[pdf\]](#) | [\[video\]](#)

Source: JobsOhio - SiteOhio [\[link\]](#)

Fredericktown Industrial Park underwent rigorous due diligence studies as a part of the usability audit designed to vet sites with companies in mind. All studies look to ensure strict criteria are met, as well as utilities and other site assets are on site with excess capacity and accessible for doing business.

 **SITEOHIO DETAILS**

Former use	Agricultural
Total acres	38.53 developable (23.44 max)
Divisible	Yes
Zoning	Industrial
Protective industrial covenants	Yes
Master development plan	Yes
Surrounding uses	Industrial
Number of years park has been in existence	14 years
Number of companies in the park	2
Distance from residential	0.5 miles
Distance from schools	1.8 miles
Distance from public parks	1.3 miles
Distance from retirement centers	8.4 miles
Distance from correctional facilities	11.2 miles
Distance from cemeteries	1.5 miles
General site configuration	Rectangular
Topography/terrain	Flat
Percent slope of site	0.1%
Is the site in a 100-year floodplain?	No
Are there any bodies of water, creeks, wetlands, etc. that impact the constructible acreage?	No
Does the site have evidence of sink holes, natural springs, etc.?	No
Are there any structures on site that will impact constructibility?	No
Are there separately owned mineral rights that would not be sold with the site?	No
Easements/ROWs	Existing road subdivides site
Is site easily accessible?	Yes
Number of roads accessing the site	2
Access controlled by traffic light?	No
Are road improvements necessary?	No
Distance to major 4-lane highway and/or interstate	.25 miles to OH-13
Can site be viewed from the highway or interstate?	Yes

Regional attainment status	
Eight-hour ozone	Yes
Particulate matter (PM 2.5)	Yes
Sulfur dioxide (1-Hour SO2)	Yes
Lead	Yes

**The entire state of Ohio is attainment for nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxides*

 **UTILITIES**

Utility information as of 11.17.2016
Utility capacities are subject to change over time. Please contact the site representative for the most recent information.

Electric to park boundaries	
Yes	
Name of provider	AEP
Excess electric capacity	14.5 MW
Distance to the electric substation	2 miles
Type of feed	Dual Feed - Single substation
Redundant	No
Total sustained interruptions annually	4
Total momentary interruptions annually	0
Total outage duration (hours/year)	9.1 hours/year

Natural gas to park boundaries	
Yes	
Name of provider	Columbia Gas
Excess gas capacity	1-15 MCF/hour
Available pressure	35 PSI
Gas line size	4 inches

Water to park boundaries	
Yes	
Name of provider	Village of Fredericktown
Excess water capacity	330,000 GPD
Total capacity of system	500,000 GPD
Water line size	10 inches

Sewer to park boundaries	
Yes	
Name of provider	Village of Fredericktown
Excess sewer capacity	500,000 GPD
Total capacity of system	700,000 GPD
Sewer line size	8 inches

Fiber/telecom to park boundaries	
Yes	
Name of provider	Consolidated Electric Cooperative

 **DUE DILIGENCE STUDIES AND REPORTS**

Phase 1 environmental report complete and clear	Yes
Geo-technical study complete and clear	Yes
Wetlands delineation complete and clear	Yes
Archaeological study complete and clear	Yes
Endangered species analysis complete and clear	Yes

From dossier for Fredericktown Industrial Park: [\[link\]](#) | [\[pdf\]](#) | [\[video\]](#)

APPENDIX D: Screenshots from DCED project, “Decommissioning and Redevelopment Playbook for the Cromby Generation Station” [\[source\]](#)



2.0 SITE ATTRIBUTES & ASSETS

The purpose of this section is to summarize existing site conditions related to redevelopment of the Cromby Generating Station Property (Site).

For more detail related to the content of this section, see the following appendices this Playbook document:

- Appendix A – Phase I Environmental Site Assessments
- Appendix B – PA Brownfield Sites Information
- Appendix C – Abatement & Demolition Narrative & Cost Estimates
- Appendix D – Permit Documents Analysis
- Appendix E – Utility Infrastructure Assessment
- Appendix H – Energy Options Assessment

- **Multimodal Transportation Access:** The Site is currently served by the Schuylkill River Trail that extends north to East Coventry Township, and South to Philadelphia.
- **Rail Access:** Over 12,000 linear feet of track, including the bridge over the Schuylkill River, lies within the Site and has the potential to connect with the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) commuter service.
- **Pipelines:** Natural Gas – Philadelphia Electric Company, Hazardous Liquid Pipeline – Laurel Pipeline Co./Buckeye Partners, Hazardous Liquid Pipeline – Interstate Energy Company.
- **Existing Utilities:** Two operating Philadelphia Electric Company substations are located within the Site. The utilities serving the Cromby Power Plant are largely in place.

2.1 SITE ATTRIBUTES & ASSETS HIGHLIGHTS

The Site is located approximately 27 miles northwest of Philadelphia, in Chester County Pennsylvania. Most of the Site is located in East Pikeland Township, with a small portion located in Phoenixville Borough. Figure 2.1.1 illustrates the Site features.

The Site is comprised of the following key site attributes:

- **Ownership:** The Site is currently owned by W.P. Cromby, LLC who is actively pursuing redevelopment opportunities.
- **Size and Zoning:** The Site is a large property consisting of 147.47 acres with zoning sections including utility, industrial, and residential.
- **River Access:** The Site has approximately 6,450 linear feet of frontage along the Schuylkill River, renowned for its recreational uses.
- **Major Road access:** The Site is within a 10 minute drive of US 422, a major trucking and commuter highway, and the PA Turnpike. However, access to the Site can only be achieved on local roads that provide an average of 21' of cartway width.



Source: DCED - Coal-Fired Power Plant Redevelopment Playbooks [\[link\]](#)

1.4 REUSE STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES SUMMARY

In response to the aforementioned characteristics, four strategic alternatives for developing the Site have been prepared. These include:

- Light Industrial
- Septa Rail Station and or Rail Car Storage
- Executive Office Park
- Energy Generation Facility

These are presented in ranked order based on factors presented in Sections 3 and 4. Each alternative responds to market forces in a different way, thus providing a menu of "plays" designed to appeal to a range of differing investor/developer goals.

REUSE STRATEGY A

Light Industrial Park/Mixed Use (Residential)

Use of the former power generation area as light industrial to accommodate life science, agriculture, and incubator facilities utilizing laboratory and research facilities, as well as light manufacturing. This accounts for nearly 55 of the 147 acres of the Site. The strategy also incorporates residential development on areas of the property adjoining with planned or current residential use, accounting for 22 acres. Renewable energy is included in the form of rooftop solar to be built onto the planned structures.

REUSE STRATEGY B


Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) Rail Station and Rail Car Storage Facility/Mixed Use

The region would be supported by adding a SEPTA rail station, thus extending the light passenger rail system up to Phoenixville. The current rail line, Reading Main Line, owned by Norfolk Southern has a connection into the SEPTA system. We have also incorporated residential development on areas of the property adjoining with planned or current residential use and retail which will complement the commuters. Renewable energy in the form of rooftop solar will be constructed onto the planned structures. The Site will serve as a needed rail car storage area for a very limited number of cars.



5.3 Potential Redevelopment Implementation Schedule

The Potential Redevelopment Implementation Schedule indicates how Phase 1 redevelopment could unfold. The schedule sets forth aggressive actions for the first 4 months culminating in formation of a PSC to coordinate and move the process forward. The next 6 months are spent preparing and marketing the site, while the remaining 18 months are allocated to design and construction of a new manufacturing facility and development of workforce initiatives to support new end users/tenants.



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